We show the fixed initial credit problem for energy games with partial-observation is Ackermann-complete.
Introduction
Energy games are two-player quantitative games of infinite horizon played on finite weighted graphs. The game is played in round in which one player, Eve, chooses letters from the automaton's alphabet whilst Adam, the second player, resolves non-determinism. The initial configuration of the game is determined by an automaton, an initial state, and an initial credit for Eve. The goal of Eve in an energy game is to keep a certain resource from being depleted. More specifically, she wins if, for every turn, the sum of the weights of the transitions traversed so far plus her initial credit is non-negative. Adam has the dual objective: witnessing a negative value.
Quantitative games, in general, are useful models for the interaction of the controller and its environment in open reactive systems. Furthermore, synthesizing controllers in this setting reduces to computing a winning strategy for one of the players in the corresponding game. Energy games in particular are useful for systems in which one is interested in the use of bounded resources such as time, power, or fuel [1, 2] .
Two decision problems for energy games have been widely studied by the formal verification community: the fixed initial credit and unknown initial credit problems. The former asks whether, given a fixed initial credit for Eve, she has a strategy which ensures all plays consistent with it are winning. The latter is more ambitious in that it asks whether there exists some initial credit such for which the same question has a positive answer. It is known that if one player has a winning strategy in an energy game, he also has a memoryless winning strategy. Furthermore, in order to win, Eve essentially has to ensure staying in cycles with non-negative (total) weight. It follows that the unknown initial credit reduces in polynomial time to the fixed initial problem. It is also known that the fixed initial credit problem is log-space equivalent to the threshold problem for mean-payoff games. This places energy games in a very special class of problems which are known to be solvable in NP ∩ coNP and for which no polynomial-time algorithm has been discovered. Multi-dimensional energy games have been studied in, amongst other works, [5] and more recently in [6] . These are the natural generalization of energy games played on singly-weighted automata to automata with vector weights on their transitions. They are relevant to the synthesis of reactive controllers sensitive to the usage of multiple resources. In this setting, it has been shown that the fixed initial credit problem is 2EXPTIME-complete while the unknown initial credit problem is simpler, namely, coNPcomplete.
In the present work we focus on a further generalization, namely, energy games with partial-observation. Such games are, once more, played on finite singly-weighted automata. The difference between classical energy games (henceforth referred to as full-observation energy games) and partial-observation energy games is that, in the latter, a partition of the states of the automaton into observations is also given as part of the input. The game is then modified so that, after every round, Eve is only informed of the observation of-and not the specific-successor state chosen by Adam (hence the partial-observability). Energy games with partial-observation where initially studied in [7] and [8] . They capture the fact that controllers in open reactive systems have limited capabilities, e.g. a finite number of sensors with limited precision. Two results from [7] are of particular interest to us. First the unknown initial credit problem for energy games with partial-observation was shown to be undecidable by reduction from the halting problem for Minsky machines. Second, decidability of the fixed initial credit problem was established by describing a reduction to finite reachability games.
Contributions. In this work we refine the upper and lower bounds for the fixed initial credit problem for energy games with partial-observation. Specifically, we show the size of the reachability game used in the algorithm from [7] is at most Ackermannian (Theorem 1). We then describe how the Minsky machine simulation used to show undecidability of the unknown initial credit problem in [7] can be modified to show Ackermann-hardness of the fixed initial credit problem (Theorem 2). This establishes Ackermanncompleteness of the problem.
Further related works. It is known that a lower bound for blind 2 quantitative games with objective Ω translates into a lower bound for the universality problem for quantitative automata with the dual acceptance condition (i.e. an infinite word x is accepted by the automaton if it has a run on x with the property ¬Ω). Conversely, an upper bound for the universality problem in a specific type of quantitative automata also implies the same bound for the corresponding type of games. For instance, in [9] the undecidability result for blind mean-payoff games from [7] was used to claim the universality problem for mean-payoff automata is also undecidable. It is important to note, however, that unlike mean-payoff the energy objective is not the dual of itself. It follows that the Ackermann-completeness result presently obtained indeed implies Ackermann-hardness of the universality problem for a specific type of quantitative automata but not for "energy automata". It is interesting to note that energy automata have indeed been studied in the form of one-counter nets in [10] and that universality for this kind of automata is actually Ackermann-complete as well.
Preliminaries
Games. A weighted game with partial-observation (or just game, for short) is a tuple (Q, q 0 , Σ, ∆, w, Obs) where Q is a finite set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, Σ is a finite alphabet of actions or symbols, ∆ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is a total transition relation, w : ∆ → Z is a weight function, and Obs ⊆ P(Q) is a partition of Q into observations. If Obs = {Q} we say the game is blind, if Obs = {{q} | q ∈ Q} we say it is a full-observation game. For s ⊆ Q, denote by post σ (s) := {q ′ ∈ Q | q ∈ s ∧ (q, σ, q ′ ) ∈ ∆} the set of σ-successors of s.
Unless otherwise stated, in what follows we consider a fixed G = (Q, q 0 , Σ, ∆, w, Obs).
Plays.
A play in G is an infinite sequence π = q 0 σ 0 q 1 . . . such that (q i , σ i , q i+1 ) ∈ ∆, for all i ≥ 0. For play π and integers 0 ≤ i ≤ j, we denote by π[i..j] the infix q i . . . q j of π. The set of concrete plays in G is denoted Plays(G) and the set of prefixes is written Prefs(G). The unique observation containing state q is denoted by obs(q). We extend obs(·) to plays and prefixes in the natural way. For instance, we obtain the observation sequence obs(π) of play π as follows: obs(q 0 )σ 0 obs(q 1 )σ 1 . . . .
Energy objectives.
An objective in a game corresponds to a set of "good" plays.
The energy level of a play prefix
The energy objective is parameterized by an initial credit c 0 ∈ N and is defined as follows:
In other words, the energy objective asks for the energy level of a play never to drop below 0 when starting with energy level c 0 .
Strategies. A strategy for Eve is a function
. . is consistent with a strategy σ for Eve if σ(π(i)) = σ i , for all i ≥ 0. We say a strategy σ for Eve is a winning strategy for her in a game with objective Ω if all plays consistent with σ are in Ω.
We don't formalize the notion of strategy for Adam here. Intuitively, given a play prefix and an action σ ∈ Σ, he selects a σ-successor q of the current state and reveals obs(q) to Eve.
Problem 1 (Fixed initial credit problem). Given a game G and an initial credit c 0 , decide whether there exists a winning observation-based strategy for Eve for the objective
PosEn(c 0 ).
Problem 2 (Unknown initial credit problem). Given a game G, decide whether there exists an initial credit c 0 and a winning observation-based strategy for Eve for the objective PosEn(c 0 ).
The fast-growing hierarchy. This hierarchy [11] is built from a sequence (F i ) i≥0 of number-theoretic functions defined inductively below.
We summarize some interesting properties of the hierarchy in the following lemma.
• for all i ≤ j and 0 ≤ n ≤ m, F j (m) ≥ F i (n) and the latter is strict if the inequality between j and i or m and n is strict;
Furthermore, for all primitive-recursive functions f , there
For n ≤ ω, let F n be the smallest set of functions containing all constants and being closed under sum, projections, substitution, limited recursion, and application of any F k for k ≤ n. We say a function is Ackermannian if it is in the set F ω \ k≤ω F k .
We consider the following variant of the Ackermann function Ack(x) := F x (x). It is not hard to show that Ack dominates all F i -that is, for all i ∈ N. It follows that Ack is not primitive-recursive.
Upper bound
The fixed initial credit problem was shown to be decidable in [7] (Theorem 1). To do so, the problem is reduced to determining the winner on a finite reachability game played on a finite tree whose nodes are functions which encode the belief of Eve in the original game. The notion of belief corresponds to the information Eve has about the current state (at any turn) of a game with partialobservation. In this particular case, the belief of Eve is defined by a prefix π = q 0 σ 0 . . . σ n−1 q n with o = obs(q n ). It corresponds to the subset of states s ⊆ o which are reachable from q 0 via a prefix π ′ with the same observation sequence as π, i.e. obs(π) = obs(π ′ ), together with the energy levels of all prefixes ending in q for all q ∈ s. Note that Eve only really cares about the minimal energy levels of prefixes ending in states from s. This information can thus be encoded into functions. These functions map states to natural numbers. Hence, using Dickson's lemma, they are able to argue that the new game is finite (albeit, of non-primitive-recursive size with respect to the original game). A more formal description follows.
Theorem 1. The fixed initial credit problem is Ackermannian.
Belief functions. For a partial-observation energy game G = (Q, q 0 , Σ, ∆, w, Obs) and fixed initial credit c 0 ∈ N define the set of belief functions of Eve F := {f : Q → Z ∪ {⊥}}. The support of a function f ∈ F is the set {q ∈ Q | f (q) = ⊥}. A function f ∈ F is said to be non-negative if f (q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ supp(f ). The initial belief function f 0 has support {q 0 } and f 0 (q 0 ) = c 0 . Given two functions f, g ∈ F we define the order f g to hold if supp(f ) = supp(g) and f (q) ≤ g(q) for all q ∈ supp(f ). Additionally, for σ ∈ Σ we say g is a σ-successor of f if ∃o ∈ Obs : supp(g) = post σ (supp(f )) ∩ o and g(q) = min{f (p) + w(p, σ, q) | p ∈ supp(f ) and (p, σ, q) ∈ ∆}. Intuitively, if Eve has belief function f and she plays σ, then if Adam reveals observation o to her as the observation of the new state of the game, she now has belief function g.
Function-action sequences.
For a function-action sequence s = f 0 σ 0 f 1 . . . σ n−1 f n we will write f s to denote f n , i.e. the last function of the sequence. Let S be the smallest subset of (F · Σ) * F containing f 0 and s · σ · f if s ∈ S, f is a σ-successor of f s and it holds that: (a) [12] . For a function f ∈ F we denote by |f | ∞ the usual infinity norm, i.e. max{f (q) | q ∈ supp(f )}. We say a se-
|Q| bounds the maximal length of sequences in S \ W that are t-controlled by κ.
We will now show how to control sequences in S (following the Karp-Miller tree analysis from [12] ). Let us denote by w max the value max{w(d) | d ∈ ∆}. Clearly, for any sequence s = f 0 σ 0 . . . σ n−1 f n ∈ S we have that for all 0 ≤ i < n
Hence, all sequences are (c 0 + w max )-controlled for f (x) = x 2 . The latter function can be shown to be in F 2 . It then follows from Proposition 1 and construction of R G that the length of any sequence s ∈ S is less than ℓ max := L G,f (c 0 + w max ). Thus, the size of R G itself is at most |∆| ℓmax . From (i) Proposition 1, (ii) the fact that Q is a part of the input, and (iii) the fact that ω is a limit ordinal, it follows that L G,f ∈ F ω . Thus ℓ max and |S| are at most Ackermannian.
Since reachability games are known to be solvable in linear time with respect to the size of the game graph (see, e.g., [13] ), the desired result follows.
Lower bound
In the sequel we will establish Ackermannian hardness of the fixed initial credit problem, thus giving a negative answer to the question of whether the problem has a primitive-recursive algorithm. This question is of particular interest in light of recent work by Jurdziński et al. [6] in which it is shown the same problem is 2EXPTIME-complete for multi-dimensional games with full-observation.
Theorem 2. The fixed initial credit problem is Ackermannhard, even for blind games.
The intuition of the proof is as follows. We first show that we can reduce the existence of a halting run bounded by m in a Minsky machine to a variation of the fixed initial credit problem. Namely, we will have different initial credits for different (blind) gadgets. This is achieved using the same gadgets as were used to establish undecidability of the unknown initial credit problem in [7] together with a new "pumping gadget". We describe how this new gadget allows Eve to convert an initial credit c 0 into at most Ack(c 0 )-for all plays which are allowed to exit the gadget. Composing these gadgets, the latter taken as the very first phase of the simulation, we are able to reduce the existence of a halting run bounded by Ack(m) in a Minsky machine to our problem. Our reduction follows closely the proof structure used in [14] to show Ackermann-hardness for lossy counter machines.
Minsky machine simulation
A 2-counter Minsky machine (2CM) consists of a finite set of control states Q, initial and final states q I , q F ∈ Q, a set of two counters C, and a finite set of instructions which act on the counters. Namely, inc k increases the value of counter k by 1, dec k decreases the same value by 1. Additionally, 0? k serves as a zero-check on counter k which blocks if the value of counter k is not equal to 0. More formally, the transition relation δ contains tuples (q, ι, k, q ′ ) where q, q ′ ∈ Q are source and target states respectively, ι is an instruction from {inc, dec, 0?} which is applied to counter k ∈ C. We focus here on deterministic 2CMs, i.e. for every state q ∈ Q either • δ has exactly one increase instruction, i.e. (q, ι, ·, ·) with ι = inc, or • δ has two instructions: a decrease (q, dec, k, ·) and a zero-check (q, 0?, k, ·) instruction. Consider a fixed 2CM M = (Q, q I , q F , C, δ). We write |M | instead of |Q| to denote the size of M . A configuration of M is a pair (q, v) of a state q ∈ Q and a valuation v : C → N. 4 A halting run of M is a finite sequence ρ = (q 0 , v 0 )δ 0 . . . δ n (q n , v n ) such that q 0 = q I , v 0 (k) = 0 for all k ∈ C, q n = q F , and v i+1 is the correct valuation 4 Note that we consider the variant of Minsky machines which guards all decreases with zero-checks. Hence, all counters will have only non-negative values at all times. of the counters after applying δ i to v i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We say the halting run ρ is m-bounded if v i (k) ≤ m for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n and all k ∈ C.
Problem 3 (Halting problem). Given a 2CM M , decide whether M has a halting run.
The above problem is known to be undecidable. Indeed, 2 counters suffice to simulate a tape and the model is therefore equivalent to Turing machines.
Problem 4 (f -Bounded halting problem). Given a 2CM
M and m ∈ N, decide whether M has an f (m)-bounded halting run.
This restricted version of the halting problem is decidable. However, if f = Ack, then it is Ackermann-hard.
In [7] the authors reduce the halting problem for a fixed M to the unknown initial credit problem on a new game G M . The main idea of the reduction presented in [7] is to let Eve play the instructions of M as actions and allow # as a special action representing the end of a run. The game is set up in a way which makes sure Eve has a winning observation-based strategy if and only if M halts. Her strategy consists in perpetually playing the halting run. To do so, they provide gadgets to ensure the following.
(i) At step i ≥ 0, Eve plays ι k if (q i−1 , ι, k, ·) ∈ δ.
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(ii) At step i ≥ 0, a 0? instruction is only played by Eve if the corresponding counter has value 0 (these values are encoded using the energy levels of plays). (iii) The end of run # action is played infinitely often. We observe that (i) and (ii) can be implemented using "one-shot punishment" gadgets. That is the gadgets provided in [7] are such that as soon as Eve cheats by using the wrong instruction or using 0? incorrectly, she loses. In fact, we have the following.
Remark 2. Only item (iii) makes use of the unknown initial credit.
To make this point clearer, we reproduce the gadget used to enforce (iii) here (Figure 1 ). Observe that, if we have a fixed initial credit c 0 then, not only does the gadget force Eve to play # infinitely often, but it also forces her to play # at least every c 0 turns.
The following intermediate result will be crucial to our argument. It follows from the assumption that M is deterministic that:
Lemma 3. For m ∈ N, if M has an m-bounded halting run, then this run has length at most |M |m.
Thus, if we give an initial credit of |M |m to the gadget enforcing (iii) and the machine has an m-bounded halting run, then Eve will win the constructed game. More formally:
Lemma 4. For any m ∈ N and c ≥ |M |m, if M has an mbounded halting run, then there is a winning observationbased strategy for Eve for the objective PosEn(c).
In the opposite direction, one can add a new state (for each counter) which has a self-loop with −1 weight on inc instructions (for the corresponding counter) and +1 weight on dec instructions (again, for the corresponding counter). In other words, we can extend the construction of G M to have new gadgets for each counter which apply the opposite of the intended action for each instruction applied on the counter. We will refer to these gadgets as the bounding gadgets. Hence, if we can get different initial credits for the gadget which ensures (iii) and the bounding gadgets, we can decide the existence of bounded halting runs in M . In the sequel, we will detail a new gadget which can be used to "pump" a fixed initial credit of c 0 up to Ack(c 0 ). This value can then be fed into G M (i.e., the bounding gadgets) as its initial credit.
Vectorial version of (F i ) i∈N
Let us now give a vectorial-based definition of the functions (F i ) i∈N . Intuitively, we will use i + 1 dimensions to keep track of how many iterations of F h (for 0 ≤ h ≤ i) still need to be applied on the current intermediate value.
More formally, for a vector a = (a k , . . . , a 0 ) ∈ N k+1 we set
It follows that Ack(x) = Φ(1,
The following is the key property associated to Φ. We are now ready to describe the final piece required to complete the proof of our main theorem. Figure 2 shows our blind gadget which allows Eve to transform an initial credit of c 0 into Ack(c 0 ) and then use N 0 to force all plays-with energy level Ack(c 0 )-into the original simulation of a Minsky machine and all other plays into a winning sink for her. The intuition of the gadget is simple, we simulate the effect of rewrite rules N 0-N 2 with the structure of the graph and allow Eve to choose which rule to apply next. Figure 2 . The alphabet allows Eve to play is {N 2, N 0} ∪ {N 1 i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. We add deterministic transitions with label N 0 from all states, except χ to the state ⊤, and from ⊤ we move into G M as before (all with weight 0). From state q i (a) if N 1 j is played and i / ∈ {j − 1, j}, or (b) if N 2 is played and i > 0, we deterministically loop with weight 0.
Gadget details. Consider the gadget depicted in
Simulation of rewrite rules. We claim that Eve can use the new gadget to get the energy level of every play ending in χ up to Ack(n). She will then be able to play N 0 and start her simulation of M in G M using Ack(n) as her initial credit and all prefixes which end in states other than χ will end up in ⊤-which is already winning for Eve. To formalize this discussion, let us focus on the reachability game R G of the gadget. Let us start with some basic observations. It follows from the game being blind that: be a belief function of Eve in the reachability game constructed from the gadget such that ({χ} ∪ {q i | 0 ≤ i ≤ n}) ⊆ supp(f ). Denote by f the pair (a f , f (χ)), where a f = (f (q n ), f (q n−1 ), . . . , f (q 0 )). The following lemma follows from construction of the gadget and induction. Note that, at any point, Eve is allowed to play N 0 and two things can then happen. First, the current state of the game could have been any state but χ and, thus, would go to ⊤. Eve clearly wins in this case. Second, the state of the game could have been χ, and we then move from χ to a second gadget. In the latter case, by Lemmas 6 and 7, and the fact that f 1 = (1, n times 0, . . . , 0, n), we have that all prefixes leaving the gadget have energy level between n and Ack(n). All other prefixes end in ⊤ and are therefore winning for Eve. Furthermore, we have that Eve can achieve exactly Ack(n) by using the word prescribed by Lemma 6. That is, playing N 2 whenever possible, then N 1 1 whenever possible, N 1 2 whenever possible, . . . , and finally N 0 when any other action would make her lose.
Putting everything together. Finally, we remark that if the value Ack(n) is fed into the bounding gadgets we need |M |Ack(n) to be fed into (iii)-see Proposition 2. We can assume n ≥ |M |. The f -Bounded halting problem remains Ackermann-hard with this assumption. We can then have a modified gadget which allows Eve to pump up to at least Ack(n) 2 , which is greater than n·Ack(n) ≥ |M |Ack(n), and then feed this value into (iii). This can be achieved, for instance, by changing the weight of the edge going into q 2 to −n+1 (since F 2 (x) > x 2 ). We then compose the general blind game by having a first copy of the original pumping gadget and then a copy of this modified gadget. The values obtained by Eve in these initial pumping phase are fed into the corresponding gadget from G M . This concludes our proof of Ackermann hardness.
